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Abstract 
Prior research documents the existence of two distinct post-earnings-announcement-drifts. 
Interestingly, investors seem to underreact more toward analyst-based earnings surprises than 
toward seasonal random walk earnings surprises. In this paper, we measure the extent of 
investors’ delayed reaction relative to the total market response to the earnings surprises. Using 
this measure, we find that investors react proportionately faster and more thoroughly to analyst-
based earnings surprises than to random walk earnings surprises, suggesting that analyst-based 
earnings surprises are relatively less related with a delayed investor reaction compared with 
random walk earnings surprises. We also find that as the informativeness of analyst earnings 
forecasts increases, investors’ response to earnings surprises increases more in instant form than 
in delayed form. In contrast, as the informativeness of random walk earnings expectations 
increases, investors’ delayed response increases more than their instant response. Finally, we 
find that investors’ faster and more thorough response to analyst-based earnings surprises 
increases in the quality of the firms’ information environment. Our results complement existing 
research findings by utilizing a relative PEAD measure and provide a greater understanding 
toward the interpretation of both drifts. 
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1. Introduction   
We examine the extent of delayed investor reaction toward earnings announcements 
based on seasonal random walk earnings surprises (hereafter RW drift) and analyst-based 
earnings surprises (hereafter AF drift). The existence of two distinct post-earnings-
announcement-drifts (hereafter PEAD) has been well documented in prior research (e.g., Doyle, 
Lundholm, and Soliman 2006; Livnat and Mendenhall 2006). Specifically, these studies show 
that the pattern of returns around subsequent earnings announcements is markedly different for 
analyst forecast errors than for time-series errors. Interestingly, they also find that AF drift 
(based on I/B/E/S analyst forecast) is consistently and significantly larger than RW drift.  
To better understand the nature of both drifts, extant research has been focused on 
examining factors that will account for the differences driving the AF and RW drifts. For 
example, Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) find that differences between both drifts are not 
attributed to either Compustat’s policy of restating quarterly earnings or I/B/E/S’s policy of 
excluding special items from their definition of reported (street) earnings. Doyle, Lundholm, and 
Soliman (2006) find that industry differences, scaling effects or risk factors do not explain the 
differences in patterns of returns between both drifts. More recently, Ayers, Li and Yeung (2011) 
provide a partial explanation to the existence of both drifts. The authors find that the RW drift is 
partly attributed to delayed trading by small investors who fail to understand the time-series 
properties of earnings, whereas the AF drift is partially due to delayed trades associated with 
institutional and other large traders.  
The conventional approach in PEAD-related studies is to compare hedge returns between 
the top and bottom surprises deciles ranked by a chosen measure of earnings surprises. Using this 
method, Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) find that there is a one percentage point per quarter 
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difference in hedge returns between the two measures of earnings surprises. Thus, the authors 
conclude that the AF drift is about 30% larger in magnitude than the RW drift. What remains 
unclear is why and whether we should expect analysts’ forecasts based earnings surprises to have 
a more delayed investor reaction than those based on random walk forecasts.  
To examine this issue, we provide an alternative perspective and examine the magnitude 
of both drifts using a relative measure of investor underreaction. We construct a relative PEAD 
measure (i.e., drift ratio) that measures the extent of investor underreaction based on their total 
market response to the earnings announcements. Using the drift ratios, we are able to show that 
the extent of investor underreaction is proportionally lower when investors react to analyst-based 
earnings surprises than when they react to random walk earnings surprises. Specifically, we find 
that the mean (median) extent of investor underreaction is 44% (45%) relative to investors’ total 
response to the earnings announcements for the analyst-based earnings surprises. In contrast, the 
mean (median) extent of investor underreaction is 51% (55%) relative to investors’ total 
response to the earnings announcements for random walk earnings surprises. 
Previous research has shown that both the RW drift and the AF drift have declined in 
recent years (e.g., Ayers, Li and Yeung 2011). We conduct further analyses to examine not only 
the drift but also the earnings announcement window response. Based on the trend of the drift 
ratios across the years, we find that there is evidence to indicate that the earnings response 
coefficients during the earnings announcement window have increased monotonically over the 
years whereas the delayed investor reaction to earnings announcements during the drift period 
have significantly declined in recent years. Furthermore, we find that these changes are more 
prominent for analyst-based earnings surprises than for the time-series earnings surprises. More 
specifically, the AF drift ratio has decreased to less than 25% (2005-2010) compared to greater 
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than 50% in the earlier years (1984-1995), while the RW drift ratio has decreased to about 48% 
(2005-2010) compared to about 60% in the earlier years (1984-1995). Based on these findings, 
we conclude that analysts, on average, provide more relevant and useful earnings forecasts in 
recent years than in earlier years of our sample period. Our findings also suggest that the market 
is increasingly more efficient in interpreting the impact of current news information to future 
earnings, which is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis arguing that arbitrage 
opportunities are competed away. 
To examine the construct validity of our measure (i.e., drift ratio), we also perform 
several analyses. We measure each earnings forecast’s past accuracy, which is our operational 
proxy for the informativeness of earnings forecasts, and we examine its impact on the drift ratio. 
We find that the total market response increases in the accuracy of past earnings forecasts for 
both the time-series based and the analyst-based earnings forecasts. However, past accuracy of 
each earnings forecast measure affects two drift ratios in different ways. The AF drift ratio 
decreases in the accuracy of past analysts’ earnings forecasts, whereas the RW drift ratio 
increases in the accuracy of past time-series based earnings expectations. This result suggests 
that the past accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts provides more relevant and useful 
information to investors than the past accuracy of time-series based earnings forecasts.   
Finally, we find that there is a cross-sectional variation to the drift ratio with information 
environment of the firms. Specifically, firms with a higher quality information environment (e.g., 
bigger firms, firms with greater analyst following, firms with high share prices, and firms with 
larger trading volume) experience a lower drift ratio. In addition, we find that the AF drift ratio is 
much smaller than the RW drift ratio for the firms with a higher quality of information 
environment, suggesting that investors respond much faster and more thoroughly to the earnings 
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news at the earnings announcement window toward analyst-based earnings surprises than toward 
time-series based earnings surprises when it is likely that there exist more concurrent information 
about the firm’s fundamentals. In other words, this result suggests that analyst forecasts are even 
more useful and relevant to investors than time-series earnings forecasts when the quality of the 
firm’s information environment is higher. 
Our study has implications as to how one examines the PEAD. By augmenting traditional 
PEAD analysis with our measure, we are able to show more clearly the nature and underlying 
implications of the extent of investor underreaction to earnings surprises. This is important 
because Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) call upon researchers to better understand the true nature 
of the PEAD anomaly. Hence we provide a new perspective toward examining the PEAD 
anomaly that reconciles potentially conflicting findings in prior research. Our study also suggests 
that analyst-based earnings surprises are relatively less (not more) related with a delayed investor 
reaction compared with time-series based earnings surprises. 
Our study also contributes to the literature that examines the role of analysts as 
information intermediaries (e.g., Schipper 1991). By exploiting a relative PEAD measure, we 
demonstrate the relative extent to which investors pay attention to analyst reports. That is, our 
tests enable researchers to better assess how promptly investors react to analyst-based earnings 
surprises across different firms in a comparable fashion, and how informative these analyst 
forecasts are to investors. Specifically, our results show that analyst earnings forecasts brings 
greater and more instant investor reactions than time-series based earnings expectations, 
suggesting that analyst earnings forecasts are better measure of earnings expectations than  time-
series based earnings expectations. Our results also show that analyst forecasts are even more 
useful and relevant to investors when the quality of the firm’s information environment is good. 
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Hence, our study supports the importance of analysts as information intermediaries in mitigating 
the post-earnings-announcement-drift. In that regard, we extend research that examines the role 
of analyst intermediation toward facilitating stock market efficiency.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our data and measurement of variables. Section 4 presents the main results 
and other additional analyses. Section 5 checks robustness of our results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Main Hypotheses   
The PEAD is viewed as one of the best-documented and most-resilient capital markets 
anomalies (Fama 1998). The efficient market hypothesis implies that in a (semi-strong) efficient 
market, investors should instantaneously adjust their expectations upon receiving new 
information that have implications on firms’ future earnings. This, in turn, should be reflected 
instantaneously in stock prices. However, researchers have documented evidence inconsistent 
with this implication. Various explanations have been put forward to suggest why there is 
investor underreaction. Specifically, there is a rich literature exploring how the PEAD varies 
with the cross-sectional variation in various firm-specific characteristics.
1
  
Research into the PEAD typically requires a measure for estimating the earnings surprise 
(i.e., actual earnings minus forecasted earnings) scaled by a deflator. Livnat and Mendenhall 
(2006) document that most studies traditionally use a time-series expectation model to predict 
earnings, although more recent studies utilize some forms of analysts’ forecasts. Hence, recent 
research that compares different forms of earnings surprises has found the existence of two 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bernard and Thomas (1989) for a comprehensive review of possible explanations of causes for the post-
earnings announcement drift. More recently, Richardson, Tuna and Wysocki (2010) provide a review of research advances made 
toward understanding the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly in the last ten years. 
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distinct PEADs. Specifically, Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 
(2006) demonstrate the existence of two distinctly different PEADs. In their related study, Ayers, 
Li, and Yeung (2011) also conclude that both drifts are quite different even through both 
empirical regularities are being manifested as an investor underreaction to earnings surprises.  
Interestingly, all three studies show that the magnitude of the AF drift is larger than that 
of the RW drift. For example, Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) document a 4.91% return based on 
a hedging trading strategy formed using the top and bottom analyst-based earnings surprise 
deciles. In contrast, the Compustat drift for their subsample of firms is only 3.77%, which is 
more than a percentage point difference in quarterly hedged returns. Likewise, Doyle, Lundholm, 
and Soliman (2006) find that returns subsequent to earnings announcements for earnings 
surprises relative to analyst forecasts are much larger, persist for much longer and are positive 
for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Ayers, Li, and Yeung (2011) also reported results that 
are comparable to Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). Specifically, they find that the magnitude of 
AF drift in their sample is 4.8% whereas the magnitude of the RW drift for their sample firms is 
4.3%. 
To ascertain whether these are distinctly different forms of investor underreaction, these 
studies also implement additional analyses to examine the underlying source(s) that could 
potentially explain differences between both drifts. For example, Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) 
show that differences between both drifts are not attributed to either Compustat’s policy of 
restating quarterly earnings or I/B/E/S’s policy of excluding special items from their definition of 
reported earnings. Specifically, they find that 75-90% of their total sample is unaffected by 
restatements, special items or the total difference between Compustat and I/B/E/S measures of 
reported earnings. Hence, they conclude that differences between both drifts appear to be 
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attributable to differences between analyst and time-series forecasts or factors associated with 
these differences, and not attributable to differences in reported earnings between the two data 
sources.  
Likewise, Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2006) find that industry differences, scaling 
effects or risk factors do not explain the differences in patterns of returns between both drifts. 
They also find that extreme stock returns following I/B/E/S earnings surprises tend to be 
concentrated among firms that are “neglected” (i.e., firms with relatively high book-to-market 
ratios), firms with low analyst coverage, and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion. 
Consistent with prior research, they also show that the returns to their trading hedge strategy are 
highest in the quartile of firms where transactions costs are highest (e.g., Bhushan 1994; Ng, 
Rusticus, and Verdi 2008) and institutional investor interest is lowest (e.g., Bartov, 
Radhakrishnan, and Krinshy 2000; Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005).  
More recently, Ayers, Li, and Yeung (2011) examine whether both drifts are driven by 
different sets of investors. They hypothesize that the RW (AF) drift is attributable to the trading 
activities of small (large) traders who underreact to different forms of earnings innovations. 
Consistent with their hypotheses, they find that small (large) traders continue to trade in the 
direction of RW (AF) earnings surprises after earnings announcements. They also find that the 
RW (AF) drift attenuates when small (large) traders react more thoroughly to RW (AF) based 
earnings surprises during the announcement period. Hence they conclude that the RW drift is 
largely explained by small traders’ failure to understand the time-series property of earnings 
whereas the AF drift is due to a longer price discovery process by large traders (with a more 
sophisticated earnings expectation model) who underreact due to information uncertainty toward 
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the analyst-based earnings surprises. In sum, they conclude that the underlying natures of the two 
drifts are qualitatively different. 
While it is clear from these studies that there are two distinctly different PEADs, what 
remains unaddressed in extant research is whether and why we should expect analyst-based 
earnings surprises to have a more delayed investor reaction than random walk based earnings 
surprises. This is especially so given that there is potentially more investor attentions toward the 
analyst-based earnings surprises than the random walk forecasts. More specifically, even though 
an earlier study by Walther (1997) shows that both random walk earnings surprise and analyst-
based earnings surprise have incremental explanatory power of market responses, more recent 
studies discuss propensities and consequences of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings (e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; Koh, Matsumoto, and 
Rajgopal 2008). Brown and Caylor (2005) show that valuation consequence of avoiding negative 
earnings surprise, which is based on analysts’ forecasts, is greater than that of avoiding earnings 
decrease compared to the same quarter last year, especially in recent years. To explain this 
phenomenon, Brown and Calyor (2005) also propose several potential reasons such as an 
increased media coverage given to analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered 
by analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts. 
Another important reason that we may expect less delayed investor reaction toward analyst-
based earnings surprises than toward random walk earnings surprises is that analysts play as 
information intermediaries in improving firms’ information environment and reducing 
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information uncertainty, which consequently enhances market efficiency and therefore reduces 
underreactions (Schipper 1991; Jiang, Lee, and Zhang 2005; Zhang 2006; Francis et al. 2007).
2
  
Considering above mentioned studies, we expect analyst-based earnings surprises to have 
less (not more) delayed investor reaction than random walk based earnings surprises, which is 
however not clearly supported by previous studies. The conventional approach in PEAD-related 
studies is to compare hedge returns between the top and bottom surprises deciles ranked by a 
chosen measure of earnings surprises. Instead, we examine the magnitude of both drifts using a 
relative measure of investor underreaction. In other words, we examine the differences in the 
delayed portion of investors’ response relative to their total market response (i.e., the drift ratio), 
and then we hypothesize that the magnitude of the AF drift based on our relative PEAD measure 
(i.e., AF drift ratio) is expected to be lower than the magnitude of RW drift (i.e., RW drift ratio). 
We formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: The delayed portion of investors’ response relative to investors’ total response 
toward analyst-based earnings surprise is smaller than that toward random walk 
based earnings surprise (i.e., AF drift ratio is smaller than RW drift ratio).  
 
The classical efficient market hypothesis suggests that arbitrage opportunities are 
competed away and the profitability of the strategy designed to exploit the arbitrage eventually 
eliminated. Letting aside the debate on whether the efficient market hypothesis itself is valid or 
not, we have seen several empirical findings to support some forms, if not all, of arbitrage 
opportunities are competed away over time.  For example, Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) 
                                                 
2 Ayers, Li, and Yeung (2011) suggest that a potential reason to explain cross-sectional variation in the AF drift is because of a 
longer price discovery process when the analyst-based earnings surprises are more difficult to interpret (e.g., when analyst 
forecast dispersion is large). However, they do not explain why the AF drift is larger than the RW drift.  
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provide evidence that transient institutional investors exploit the PEAD and those investors 
generate abnormal returns of 5.1 percent (or 22 percent annualized) after transaction costs. In 
addition, their arbitrage trades accelerate the speed that stock prices reflect the implications of 
current earnings for future earnings. Green, Hand, and Soliman (2011) also find that hedge 
returns to Sloan’s (1996) accruals anomaly have decayed in U.S. stock markets to the point that 
they are no longer positive, and they suggest that the anomaly’s demise partly due to an increase 
in the capital invested by hedge funds into exploiting the signal. Consistent with these findings, 
Ayers, Li, and Yeung (2011) show that both the RW drift and the AF drift have declined over 
time. To extend these studies and provide a more complete perspective of the relation between 
earnings surprises (either based on analyst forecasts or time-series) and investors’ responses 
(either in the immediate form or in a delayed form), we examine whether there are over-time 
changes to the extent of investor underreaction based on our relative PEAD measure.  
Although both AF drift and RW drift have been good targets for arbitrage profits, we may 
infer from the literature that investors pay attention on AF drift and try to exploit AF drift more 
than RW drift because the magnitude of AF drift is larger than that of RW drift as shown by 
Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2006) and Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). In addition to these 
studies, by examining short earnings announcement window returns, Brown and Calyor (2005) 
show that investors reward firms for reporting quarterly earnings that meet or beat analysts’ 
estimates more than for meeting other thresholds such as avoiding loss or earnings decrease in 
later sample period (i.e., 1993-2002) but not in earlier sample period (i.e., 1985-1992) of their 
study. This finding suggests that investors’ response toward analyst-based earnings surprises and 
time-series earnings surprise change over time. Another related study which examines cross-
sectional variation in the AF drift is Zhang (2008). Zhang (2008) finds that the market reacts 
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earlier when analysts are responsive and revise their forecasts promptly in response to earnings 
announcements. She further finds that analysts revise their forecasts promptly more in recent 
years than in previous years. Specifically, she finds that the percentage of responsive analysts, 
defined as analysts who issue a forecast revision within two trading days after the earnings 
announcements have doubled from 26% in 1996 to almost 53% in 2002. Given the increasing 
frequency of analysts who revise their earnings forecasts, we would expect that there should be 
less delayed reaction in recent years than in previous years. 
Combining these findings, we expect to find a greater (less) investor response toward 
both analyst-based and time-series earnings surprises in the earnings announcement window (in 
the drift window) in recent years than in previous years. In addition, we expect that this change 
in investor response toward earnings surprises over time is more prominent for analyst-based 
earnings surprise than for time-series earnings surprise. We develop the hypotheses as follows: 
 
H2a: The market response to earnings announcements during the earnings 
announcement window (during the drift period) increases (decreases) over time 
(i.e., drift ratio decreases over time). 
H2b: The increasing (decreasing) market response to earnings announcements during 
the earnings announcement window (during the drift period) over time is more 
prominent toward analyst-based earnings surprise than toward random walk 
earnings surprise (i.e., AF drift ratio decreases more than RW drift ratio over 
time). 
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It goes without saying that investors’ response increases in the informativeness of the 
earnings news, and we may assume that analysts who forecast accurately provide more useful 
information to the investors than the analysts who do not forecast very accurately. By using the 
accuracy of analysts’ past forecasts, Park and Stice (2000) show that investors indeed recognize 
the differential forecasting ability of individual analysts, and this difference is reflected in the 
price reaction to forecast revisions. By using the accuracy of past earnings forecasts (not only 
analysts’ past forecasts but also time-series earnings expectations), we extend Park and Stice 
(2000) and expect that when the current earnings news provides more useful information about 
the future earnings (i.e., when the accuracy of past earnings forecasts is high) investors react 
more in an immediate form than in delayed form. 
With respect to the value relevance of each earnings news, Brown and Caylor (2005) 
suggest that the valuation consequence of meeting or beating analyst forecasts is getting greater 
than that of meeting or beating earnings of the same quarter last year. If the value relevance of 
analyst-based earnings surprise is greater than that of time-series earnings surprise, we can also 
expect that the past accuracy of analyst forecasts is more informative and useful than the past 
accuracy of time-series earnings forecasts.  Therefore, we hypothesize that as the accuracy of the 
past earnings forecasts increases the delayed portion of investors’ response to their total market 
response toward earnings surprise decreases. We also hypothesize that the accuracy of past 
analysts’ earnings forecasts plays a bigger role than the accuracy of past time-series earnings 
expectation in decreasing the delayed portion of investors’ response to their total market 
response toward earnings surprise.  
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H3a: The delayed portion of investors’ response relative to their total market response 
toward earnings surprise decreases in the accuracy of past earnings forecasts 
(i.e., drift ratio decreases in the accuracy of past earnings forecasts).  
H3b: The delayed portion of investors’ response relative to their total market response 
toward analyst-based earnings surprise decreases in the accuracy of past analyst 
earnings forecasts more than the delayed portion of investors’ response relative 
to their total market response toward random walk earnings surprise decreases in 
the accuracy of past random walk earnings surprise (i.e., AF drift ratio decreases 
in the accuracy of past analyst earnings forecasts more than RW drift ratio 
decreases in the accuracy of past random walk earnings forecasts).   
 
Finally, we examine whether there is a cross-sectional variation in our relative PEAD 
measure to changes in firms’ information environment characteristics. Prior research postulates 
that the magnitude of the PEAD is negatively associated with the richness of a firm’s 
information environment proxied for by firm size, number of analyst following, share prices, and 
trading volumes, etc. (Jiang, Lee, and Zhang 2005; Zhang 2006; Francis et al. 2007). If what 
early studies mean by the magnitude of the PEAD is a less delayed investor reaction to the 
earnings announcements, this postulation should be also true to our alternative measure for the 
PEAD (i.e., drift ratio). In other words, the drift ratio should be negatively associated with the 
richness of a firm’s information environment.  
In addition, if the value relevance of analyst-based earnings surprise is greater than that 
of time-series earnings surprise as we discussed earlier, we can also expect that the richness of a 
firm’s information environment makes analysts’ forecasts more informative and useful than 
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time-series earnings forecasts. For example, suppose two firms; one is very big and followed by 
many analysts and the other is relatively small and followed by only a few analysts. When the 
same magnitude of earnings surprises, which are based on analysts’ forecasts, occur to these two 
companies, the value relevance of earnings surprise should be greater to the former than the 
latter, because the big company is less likely to have earnings surprise than the small company 
due to heavy monitoring by sophisticated expertise (i.e., analysts). Based on this reasoning, we 
develop our last two hypotheses as follows: 
 
H4a: The delayed portion of investors’ response relative to their total market response 
toward earnings surprise decreases as the firm specific information environment 
improves (i.e., drift ratio decreases as the firm specific information environment 
improves)  
H4b: The delayed portion of investors’ response relative to their total market response 
toward analyst earnings surprise decreases more than toward random walk 
earnings surprise as the firm specific information environment improves (i.e., AF 
drift ratio decreases more than RW drift ratio as the firm specific information 
environment improves).  
 
3. Research Design and Data  
3.1. Estimating Earnings Surprise  
Consistent with many prior studies, we define the earnings surprise as actual earnings 
minus expected earnings, scaled by stock price. We use two different earnings surprise measures: 
time-series based earnings surprise and analyst forecast based earning surprise. We name the 
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former SUE and the latter SUEAF. For SUE, we use a rolling seasonal random walk model 
following many prior drift studies. Specifically, our time-series measure of earnings surprise 
(SUE) is given by the following equation: 
it
itit
it
P
XX
SUE
)( 4     (1) 
where Xit is primary Earnings Per Share (EPS) before extraordinary items for firm i in quarter t 
(Compustat item EPSPXQ), and Pit is the price per share for firm i at the end of quarter t from 
Compustat. Xit and Pit are unadjusted for stock splits, but Xit−4 is adjusted for any stock splits and 
stock dividends during the period {t−4, t}. If most analyst forecasts of EPS are based on diluted 
EPS, we use Compustat’s diluted EPS figures (Compustat item EPSFXQ) in equation (1).  
As for SUEAF, we replace the seasonal random work forecast (Xit−4) with a measure of 
analysts’ expectations, and replace Compustat actual EPS (Xit) with I/B/E/S actual.  Considering 
only the most recent forecast for each analyst, our measure of analysts’ expectations is the 
median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the ninety days prior to the earnings announcement.
3
  
To address the existence of outliers and nonlinearities in the earnings surprise–return 
relation, most drift studies classify firms into ten portfolios based on earnings surprises (e.g., 
Bernard and Thomas (1990), Bhushan (1994), and Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000)). 
The analysis is then performed on portfolio ranks scaled between 0 and 1. Following a 
methodology used in Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), we subtract 0.5 from the SUE (or SUEAF) 
decile rank in order to assign a score of 0 to a mythical median observation. Thus, the slope 
coefficient in the regression of abnormal returns on the earnings surprise decile rank (DSUE or 
                                                 
3 This measure of earnings surprise is one of the earnings surprise measures used by Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). They also 
use Compustat actual instead of I/B/E/S actual for their analyses and obtain similar results. Other prior studies use similar 
earnings surprise measures. For example, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) take forecasts from Value Line, and Mendenhall (2004) 
takes actual earnings from their forecast providers and deflates earnings surprise by the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.  
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DSUEAF) may be interpreted as the return to a hedge portfolio that takes long position on the 
most positive SUE or SUEAF decile and short position on the most negative SUE or SUEAF 
decile. Bernard and Thomas (1990) report that the drift is insensitive to whether one assigns 
firms into SUE deciles based on the current quarter’s SUE values, or  one uses implementable 
rule such as SUE cutoffs from quarter t−1, so we use the current quarter’s SUE values for our 
analyses.  
 
3.2. Cumulative abnormal returns  
Daily abnormal returns are calculated as the raw daily return from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) minus the daily return on the portfolio of firms with 
approximately the same size (the market value of equity as of June) and book-to-market (B/M) 
ratio (as of the prior December). We use six classifications of the population (two size and three 
B/M portfolios), and we obtain the daily returns and cutoff points from Professor Kenneth 
French’s library.  
To estimate the drift, we sum daily abnormal returns over the period from two days after 
the current earnings announcement through one day after the following quarterly earnings 
announcement, and we name it CAR(Drift).
4
 To measure the immediate short-term earnings 
announcement return we sum three daily abnormal returns, including the day preceding the 
Compustat announcement date, the announcement date, and the following day, and we name it 
CAR(Earnings Announcement Window). We also measure the total market response by summing 
CAR(Drift) and CAR(Earnings Announcement Window), and we name it CAR(Total). 
 
                                                 
4 This drift period is the same as the one used in Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). Some other studies use (2, 60) or (5, 65) trading 
day window, where 0 is the earnings announcement date (e.g., Liang (2003), Ayers, Li, and Yeung(2011)) 
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3.3. Relative drift measure 
To examine the relation between earnings surprises and investors’ responses, we regress 
each abnormal return on earnings surprise measures such as following.   
ititit SurpriseEarningsCAR   _10    (2) 
For these regression analyses, our two earning surprise measures (SUE and SUEAF) are adjusted 
and transformed into DSUE and DSUEAF, which have the values between -0.5 and 0.5, as 
discussed earlier.  We also use three different cumulative abnormal returns in our analyses (i.e., 
CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings Announcement Window), and CAR(Drift)). Therefore, we obtain 
three different hedge returns which represent investors’ total market response, investors’ 
immediate market response, and their delayed market response to the earnings surprise, 
respectively.  
Using the estimates from these regressions, we construct a relative PEAD measure (i.e., 
drift ratio) that measures the extent of investor underreaction based on their total market response 
to the earnings surprise. Specifically, the drift ratio of time-series based earnings surprise is 
calculated by the coefficient estimate on DSUE in the regression of CAR(Drift) divided by the 
coefficient estimate on DSUE in the regression of CAR(Total).  Similarly, the drift ratio of 
analyst-based earnings surprise is calculated by the coefficient estimate on DSUEAF in the 
regression of CAR(Drift) divided by the coefficient estimate on DSUEAF in the regression of 
CAR(Total).  Therefore, a high (low) level of drift ratio is interpreted to imply that a large (small) 
portion of response is delayed relative to its total market response.  
 
3.4. Informativeness of earnings forecasts 
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In addition to typical variables used in drift studies, we construct new variables to 
measure the informativeness of earnings forecasts.  Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  is the average 
absolute values of SUE of the past twelve quarters for a specific firm-quarter, while Mean Abs. 
SUEAF(t-12, t-1)  is the average absolute values of SUEAF of the past twelve quarters. These 
variables capture how much the actual earnings have been deviated from earnings forecasts 
historically. Thus, a low value for these variables indicates that there have been less deviations or 
surprises from the earnings forecasts for a specific firm for the past twelve quarters. For example, 
a low Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)  means that analyst forecasts for the past three years have been 
quite accurate, thus we can infer that for this firm analyst forecasts provide more relevant 
information compared with other firms for which analyst forecasts have not been very accurate.  
When we estimate these measures, Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  (SUEAF(t-12, t-1)) is marked as missing 
if the firm-quarters have less than nine SUEs (SUEAFs) during the past twelve quarters. 
 
3.5. Sample selection 
An initial sample is obtained from Compustat for all firms with available data over the 
period 1981–2010. Since our analysis focuses on a comparison between time-series based 
earnings expectations and analyst forecasts, we require that observations have at least one analyst 
forecast from I/B/E/S. Other selection criteria for each observation for firm-quarter t are as 
follows: 
1) The earnings announcement date is reported in Compustat for both quarter t and 
quarter t+1 (returns are cumulated through the next earnings announcement date). The 
difference of earnings report dates in Compustat and in I/B/E/S should not be more 
than one calendar day. 
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2) The price per share is available from Compustat as of the end of quarter t, and is 
greater than $1. This reduces noise caused by small SUE deflators, and it also reduces 
issues related with stocks with low liquidity.   
3) The market (book) value of equity at the end of quarter t−1 is available from 
Compustat and is larger than $5 million (positive). This eliminates very small firms 
with low liquidity, as well as firms at their initial stages or close to liquidation.   
4) The firm’s stocks are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange, or NASDAQ.   
5) Daily returns are available in CRSP from one day before quarter t’s earnings 
announcement through one day after the announcement of earnings for quarter t+1.  
6) Data are available to assign the firm to one of the six Fama–French portfolios based on 
size and B/M.  
7) SUE as defined in equation (1) can be calculated for the quarter.  
8) Average absolute values of SUE or SUEAF of the past twelve (at least nine) quarters 
can be calculated.  
After applying the above data requirements, our final sample comprises 224,412 
observations for 9,470 firms from Q1/1984 to Q4/2010. Our sample size is bigger than the 
corresponding sample size (107,893) of Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) because their sample 
period (Q1/1987 to Q2/2003) is shorter than ours. Our sample expands from 109 firms in the first 
quarter of 1984 to 2,127 firms in the fourth quarter of 2010.   
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all observations.  Overall, the summary statistics 
of the variables are similar with those of previous studies. Specifically, the mean and median 
SUE and SUEAF are close to zero, while the time-series SUE exhibits a wide distribution with 
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extreme values compared to SUEAF. Therefore, we need to transform both earnings surprise 
measures into their decile ranks for the analyses. The mean (median) of CAR(Total) is -0.91% (-
0.51%), and the mean (median) of CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) is 0.16% (0.08%). 
The results also show that the mean (median) of CAR(Drift) is -1.07% (-0.68%).  
The mean (median) Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  is 0.0870 (0.0089), while the mean (median) 
Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)  is 0.0074 (0.0023), suggesting that analyst forecasts, on average, tend 
to reflect market earnings expectations more accurately than time-series earnings forecasts. Note 
that the sample has a wide distribution of firms in terms of size. The mean (median) of market 
value of equity at the end of the quarter is approximately $3.7 billion ($552 million). The mean 
(median) price per share is $45.03 ($20.50). The mean (median) number of analysts’ forecasts 
for firm quarter is 4.7 (3.0). Finally, we calculate the trading volume (VOLUME) as the average 
daily turnover during forty-five days before the earnings announcement, where daily turnover is 
the ratio of the number of shares traded each day to the number of shares outstanding. The mean 
and median of the VOLUME are 0.70% and 0.44%, respectively.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Relation between earnings surprises and the market responses 
Table 2 shows the regression results based on various combinations of independent and 
dependent variables of interest. Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2 shows the regression results using 
adjusted SUE (SUEAF) variable as an independent variable, and using CAR(Total), 
CAR(Earnings Announcement Window), and CAR(Drift) as dependent variables, respectively. 
The coefficient estimate on DSUE (DSUEAF) represents the hedge returns of taking a long 
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position on the highest decile of SUE (SUEAF) and a short position on the lowest decile of SUE 
(SUEAF), while the intercept is an estimate of return for the median observation.  
As we can see in the column (3) of Table 2, the magnitude of drift hedge return of DSUE 
(3.33%) shown in Panel A is smaller than the magnitude of drift hedge return of DSUEAF 
(3.90%) shown in Panel B. This implies that there is more drift in analyst-based earnings 
surprises than in time-series based earnings surprises, consistent with the finding of previous 
studies (e.g., Livnat and Mendenhall 2006; Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 2006).
5
 
Investors’ immediate responses to earnings surprises, as examined in column (2), provide 
more prominent differences between the two earnings surprise measures. The coefficient 
estimate on DSUE in column (2) is 0.0407 (or 4.07% hedge returns) and it is much smaller than 
0.0690 (or 6.90% hedge returns), which is the coefficient estimate on DSUEAF shown in Panel 
B. We interpret this result to suggest that investors respond a lot more to analyst-based earnings 
surprises than to the time-series based earnings surprises around earnings announcement dates. 
These results indicate that there are differences not only in the delayed market responses between 
the analyst forecast based and time-series based models, but also highlight that there are 
differences in instant investor response between the two earnings surprise measures.  
Further, we note that the coefficient estimate on DSUE in column (2) is 0.0407 and it is 
0.0077 greater than the coefficient estimate on DSUE (0.0330) in column (3) of Panel A. 
However, the coefficient estimate on DSUEAF (0.0690) in column (2) is much greater than the 
corresponding coefficient estimate in column (3) (0.0390). This result reflects that unlike time-
series based earnings surprises, analyst forecast based earnings surprises are interpreted by 
investors as good or bad news instantaneously rather than in the form of a delayed market 
                                                 
5 In fact, the difference of hedge returns between DSUE and DSUEAF in Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) is greater than the results 
reported in our study. The coefficient estimate on DSUE is 3.77(%) while the coefficient estimate on DSUEAF is 4.91(%) in 
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). These differences are due to differences in the sample periods between the two studies. 
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reaction. Finally, when we consider the total market response to earnings surprises (i.e., 
CAR(Total), which is the sum of CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) and CAR(Drift) in 
column (1)), we observe that there is a stronger investor response in DSUEAF (10.80%) than in 
DSUE (7.37%).  
The second last row in Panel B of Table 2 provide results of a likelihood ratio test 
suggested by Vuong (1989) that allows the researcher to determine which model explains more 
of the dependent variable. The results show that for all dependent variables analyst-based 
earnings surprise measure (DSUEAF in Panel B) explains much better than time-series based 
earnings surprise measure (DSUE in Panel A). While all the comparisons are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level, in particular the DSUEAF explains much better for the market 
responses around earnings announcement window with Vuong’s Z-statistic of 42.78 (column 
(2)).  
These findings provide an alternative interpretation in explaining why there is a larger 
drift in analyst-based earnings surprises compared with that in time-series based earnings 
surprises. Since the delayed portion of market response in DSUEAF (0.36 = 0.0390/0.1080 in 
Panel B) is smaller than the delayed portion of market response in DSUE (0.42 = 0.0330/0.0737 
in Panel A), this result implies that there is relatively less underreaction toward analyst-based 
earnings surprises than for time-series based earnings surprises. That is, the greater magnitude of 
drift in the SUEAF model compared with that in the SUE model should be considered with 
respect to the size of the total market responses to both earnings surprises. To examine whether 
the difference in drift ratios between DSUE and DSUEAF models is statistically significant, we 
run the regressions at every quarter to calculate the drift ratio of each quarter, and then average 
them across time. The last two columns of Table 2 show that the mean (median) RW drift ratio is 
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0.51 (0.55). Compared to these drift ratios, the mean (median) AF drift ratio is 0.44 (0.45). 
Statistical tests show that the AF drift ratio is significantly smaller than the RW drift ratio at the 
0.01 level. These results support the argument that there is relatively less underreaction in 
analyst-based earnings surprise than in time-series based earnings surprise, which is our H1.
6
  
 
4.2. Relation between earnings surprises and the market responses: across time 
In this sub-section, we further examine the changes of RW and AF drift ratios over time. 
Table 3 reports the results of the regression model based on equation (2) on different sample 
periods. Results in the last two columns show that there is no significant difference in the drift 
ratios between SUE and SUEAF model until 1998. However, the AF drift ratio has been 
consistently lower than the RW drift ratio since 1999. We also note that there is no drastic 
change in the magnitude of CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) and CAR(Drift) in DSUE 
model over time. On the contrary, there have been a significantly greater CAR(Earnings 
Announcement Window) and smaller CAR(Drift) since 1999 for the DSUEAF model than in 
earlier sample periods, which results in a smaller AF draft ratio in recent years compared with 
that in previous years.  
Alternatively, to examine the changes of RW and AF drift ratios over time we include 
recency variable in the regression model and interact it with earnings surprise measures as 
follows:  
ititititit RecencySurpriseEarningsSurpriseEarningsCAR   *__ 210   (3) 
                                                 
6 If either the coefficient estimate on Earnings_Surprise for CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) or for CAR(Drift) is negative 
for a certain quarter, the quarter is dropped for the mean and median drift ratio calculations. Out of one hundred and eight sample 
quarters (Q1/1984-Q4/2010), seventeen quarters are dropped for the mean RW drift ratio calculation, while fourteen quarters are 
dropped for the mean AF drift ratio calculation.  
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where Earnings_Surprise is either SUE or SUEAF, and Recency indicates how current the 
sample firm-quarters are. Recency equals zero if a firm-quarter belongs to Q1/1984 and increases 
by one as the firm-quarters move on to the following quarters. Thus its maximum value is 107 
when the firm-quarters belong to the most recent sample quarter (Q4/2010).  
The results in Table 4 show that the market response toward earnings news changes over 
time both in time-series based and analyst-based earnings surprises. Specifically, the results in 
column (1) (i.e., CAR(Total) as a dependent variable) show that when recency is zero, which 
means at Q1/1984, the hedge portfolio strategy of taking a long position on highest decile SUE 
and a short position on the lowest decile SUE brings 9.58% return (in Panel A), while the 
corresponding strategy brings 9.23% return for SUEAF model (in Panel B). However, -0.0003 
coefficient estimate on DSUE*Recency in Panel A indicates that as time passes by and samples 
get one-quarter recent the same hedge portfolio strategy for SUE model get 0.03% smaller 
returns, while the hedge portfolio strategy for SUEAF model gets 0.03% greater returns (note 
that the coefficient estimate on DSUEAF*Recency is 0.0003 in Panel B).   
The results in column (2) and column (3) provide more detailed information. When 
CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) is used as a dependent variable the coefficient estimates 
on both DSUE*Recency (0.0001 in Panel A) and DSUEAF*Recency (0.0007 in Panel B) are 
positive and significant. On the contrary, when CAR(Drift) is used as a dependent variable the 
coefficient estimates on both DSUE*Recency (-0.0004 in Panel A) and DSUEAF*Recency (-
0.0005 in Panel B) are negative and significant. These results suggest that investors’ instant 
response toward analyst forecast based earnings surprise increase much more than toward time-
series based earnings surprise over time. However, investors’ delayed reactions decrease about 
the same magnitudes for the time-series based earnings surprise and the analyst-based earnings 
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surprise over time. From these results, we can infer that the delayed portion of investors’ 
response relative to its total market response (i.e., a drift ratio) becomes smaller in recent years 
than in previous years especially for analyst-based earnings surprises. 
Figure 1 confirms the difference in drift ratios between SUE and SUEAF models 
graphically. In this figure, we plot the drift ratios of both the SUE and SUEAF model for each 
year from 1984 to 2010. The figure shows that the drift ratio of SUEAF has consistently been 
lower than the drift ratio of SUE since 1993 and that the gap has widened following years.  
In sum, the findings in Table 3, Table 4, and Figure 1 support our H2 and show that there 
is an increase in the magnitude of investor response to earnings surprises at the earnings 
announcement window, while there is a decreasing delayed investor reaction in the drift window 
over time. From the former, we infer that on average the informativeness of earnings news, 
especially when it is based on analyst forecasts, has increased over time. In other words, we infer 
that analysts are providing more relevant and meaningful earnings forecasts in recent years than 
in previous years. Additionally, from the finding of a decreasing delayed investor reaction in the 
drift window over time, we infer that the market is increasingly more efficient in interpreting the 
impact of current news information to future earnings.  
 
4.3. Effect of informativeness of earnings forecasts on the relation between earnings surprises 
and the market responses 
To examine the informational role of earnings forecasts and its impact on the relation 
between earnings surprises and the market responses, we use proxies for the informativeness of 
earnings forecasts (i.e., Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  and Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)).  As discussed 
earlier, lower values mean that earnings forecasts, which are either based on time-series or 
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analyst forecasts, were closer to the actual earnings for the past twelve quarters for a specific 
firm. Therefore, we can infer that a low value is associated with a more informative earnings 
forecasting model for the firm.   
We apply our operational proxies to the analysis as follows.  First, we multiply by 
negative one to the measure to make a high value mean high informativeness.  Next, similar to 
the adjustment process for SUE, we transform (-)Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  into decile ranks scaled 
between 0 and 1 by sorting firms according to every quarter. We then subtract 0.5 from the 
measure to create D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1). Finally, we interact DSUE with D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-
12, t-1)  and include the interaction term in our original regression model. Similarly, we also adjust 
Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)  and interact with DSUEAF. We run the regression model as follows: 
ititititit enessInformativSurpriseEarningsSurpriseEarningsCAR   *__ 210      (4) 
The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 5.  The results show that the 
informativeness of earnings forecasts has an incremental effect on the relation between earnings 
surprises and the market responses both in time-series based and analyst-based earnings 
surprises.  Specifically, from the results shown in column (1) (i.e., CAR(Total) as a dependent 
variable), for median Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) observations, the hedge portfolio strategy of taking a 
long position on highest decile SUE and a short position on the lowest decile SUE brings 7.62% 
return (in Panel A), while the corresponding strategy brings 11.13% return for SUEAF model (in 
Panel B).  However, the hedge portfolio strategy of taking a long position on both the highest 
decile SUE and the highest decile of D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) and taking a short position on 
both the lowest decile SUE and the lowest decile of D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  brings an 
additional 3.71% return.  Similarly, the hedge portfolio strategy considering D_Mean Abs. 
SUEAF(t-12, t-1) brings additional (and coincidentally the same) 3.71% returns, which can be seen 
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in Panel B. These results suggest that investors understand the historical performances of both 
earnings forecasts measures and respond more to the same size of earnings surprise when 
earnings forecasts have been historically accurate than when earnings forecasts have not been 
very accurate.   
Moreover, we note that the results in Panel A show that the larger incremental effect 
occurs in the drift window (2.25% shown in column (3)) than at earnings announcement window 
(1.46% shown in column (2)) in time-series based earnings surprises. On the contrary, the results 
in Panel B show that the larger incremental effect occurs in the earnings announcement window 
(3.16% shown in column (2)) compared to the drift window (0.55% shown in column (3) and 
insignificant) in analyst-based earnings surprises. This finding suggests that investors respond 
faster to the earnings news with more accurate analyst forecasts than to the earnings news with 
more accurate time-series earnings expectations. Therefore, we can infer that the informativeness 
of analyst-based earnings forecasts, proxied by historical forecast accuracy, is superior to the 
informativeness of time-series based earnings forecasts in terms of inducing investors’ timely 
responses.  
The last two columns of Table 5 show how different the drift ratios are with and without 
consideration of the past earnings forecast accuracy. Without considering the incremental effect 
of informativeness of earnings forecasts, the drift ratio of SUE is 45%, while the drift ratio of 
SUEAF is 35%.  However, after including the informativeness interaction term, the drift ratio of 
SUE model becomes 50%, which is five percentage point higher than the model without the 
interaction term. On the contrary, after including the informativeness interaction term, the drift 
ratio of SUEAF model becomes 26%, which is nine percentage point lower than the model 
without the interaction term. These results suggest that the informativeness of analyst earnings 
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forecasts expedites investors’ responses, while informativeness of time-series based earnings 
forecasts brings delayed investors’ responses.7   
We also run the regression model (4) separately in each quintile rank of our informative 
measures. The results are provided in Table 6. Rank 1 represents the firm-quarter observations 
with the least informative earnings forecasts (i.e., the worst accurate past forecasts), while rank 5 
represents those with the most informative earnings forecasts (i.e., the most accurate past 
forecasts). Consistent with the results in Table 5, the total market responses to the earnings 
surprises (i.e., CAR(Total)) increase both in the SUE (shown in Panel A) and SUEAF models 
(shown in Panel B) as the level of earnings forecast informativeness improves.   
The results also show that both CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) and CAR(Drift) 
increase almost monotonically in the level of informativeness in both the SUE and SUEAF 
models.  However, the increasing patterns in CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) and 
CAR(Drift) are different between SUE and SUEAF models. In the SUE model (Panel A), the 
market response in the drift window (i.e., CAR(Drift)) increases more than the market response 
in the earnings announcement window (i.e., CAR(Earnings Announcement Window)) as the level 
of informativeness increases, consistent with the results in Table 5. For example, at (-)Mean Abs. 
SUE(t-12, t-1) Rank 1 CAR(Drift) is 0.0269, while at (-)Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) Rank 5 CAR(Drift) is 
0.0418, suggesting that CAR(Drift) increases about 55%. In contrast, the CAR(Earnings 
Announcement Window) increases from 0.0380 to 0.0536, which represents a 41% increase. 
Therefore, as we can see in the last column of Table 5, the drift ratio increases in the level of 
informativeness of SUE model.   
                                                 
7 Ex ante, we do not expect to find that delayed investor reaction increases more toward historically more accurate time-series 
based earnings news than toward historically less accurate time-series based earnings news.  
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We find in Table 5 that the drift ratios have decreased when the informativeness of 
earnings forecasts for the SUEAF model has increased. The results in Panel B of Table 6 confirm 
this finding. For example, the market response in the earnings announcement window (i.e., 
CAR(Earnings Announcement Window)) increases more than the market response in the drift 
window (i.e., CAR(Drift)) as the level of informativeness increases. For example, at (-)Mean Abs. 
SUEAF(t-12, t-1) Rank 1 CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) is 0.0605, while at (-)Mean Abs. 
SUE(t-12, t-1) Rank 5 CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) is 0.0916, suggesting that 
CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) increases about 51%. In contrast, the CAR(Drift) 
increases from 0.0359 to 0.0452, which represents only 26% increase. Thus, as we can see in the 
last column of Table 6, the drift ratio decreases in the level of informativeness of SUEAF model. 
 In sum, based on the findings in Table 5 and Table 6, we infer that investors do care 
about the accuracy of past earnings forecasts which are either analyst-based or time-series based. 
Moreover, the results suggest that investors put more weight on the accuracy of analyst forecasts 
than on the accuracy of time-series based earnings forecasts when they instantly interpret and 
respond to the earnings news, which consequently mitigate the post-earnings-announcement 
drift. On the contrary, the accuracy of time-series based earnings forecasts increases, not 
decreases, the post-earnings-announcement drift.
8
 
 
                                                 
8
 Previous studies show that drift is positively associated with information uncertainty (e.g., Jiang et al. 2005; Zhang 2006; 
Francis et al. 2007).  The characteristics of their measures of information uncertainty are different from our infomativeness 
measure and they are mainly firm specific.  For example, they use firm size, number of analyst following, return volatility, stock 
trading volume, cash flows-accruals matching, etc, while the informativeness of earnings forecasts in our analysis is regarding the 
performance of past earnings forecasts.  However, we can infer that highly accurate past earnings forecasts certainly reduce 
overall information uncertainty.  Therefore, we should expect to find a greater AF drift for firms with lower informativeness 
levels in our analysis.  Instead, we find that the magnitude of the AF drift for the lowest informativeness level (i.e., (-)Mean Abs. 
SUEAF(t-12, t-1) Rank 1) is 3.59%, while the magnitude of the AF drift for the highest informativeness level (i.e., (-)Mean Abs. 
SUEAF(t-12, t-1) Rank 5) is 4.52%. This is inconsistent with the reasoning based on prior literature.  However, when we consider 
the total market reaction to earnings announcements and use drift ratios as alternative measure of underreaction, we see that the 
drift ratio decreases across the quintiles of firms ranked by their historical forecast accuracy.   
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4.4. Effect of firm-quarter characteristics on the relation between earnings surprises and the 
market responses 
Finally, we examine whether there is a cross-sectional variation in the drift ratios to firm 
specific information environment. Prior research postulates that the magnitude of the post-
earnings announcement drift is negatively associated with the quality of a firm’s information 
environment. Following prior studies, we use firm size, number of analyst following, share price 
of the firm, and trading volumes as proxies for information environment and split the sample into 
two subsamples based on the median value at each quarter. We then run our main regression 
model based on the equation (2) separately.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, the results in Table 7 show that when the quality of 
information environment is better or when information uncertainty is low, we find smaller drifts 
both in terms of the magnitude of the drifts and drift ratios. For example, in the sub-sample for 
firms smaller than median firm size (Panel A), the CAR(Drift) and the RW drift ratio are 0.0419 
and 0.46, respectively, while they are 0.0168 and 0.39 in the sub-sample for firms greater than 
the median firm.  Similarly, in the sub-sample for firms smaller than median firm size, the 
CAR(Drift) and the AF drift ratio are 0.0462 and 0.40, respectively, while they are 0.0250 and 
0.27 in the sub-sample for firms greater than the median firm. The tests using three other 
information environments (in Panel B through Panel D) provide similar results as in Panel A.   
More importantly, we note that the effect of information environment on the drift ratio is 
more prominent in the SUEAF model than in the SUE model. This is due to the fact that for the 
SUE model, for large firms, both the magnitude of the drift (0.0168) and the magnitude of the 
earnings announcement window response (0.0262) are significantly smaller than the 
corresponding drift (0.0419) and the earnings announcement window response (0.0494) for small 
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firms. On the contrary, for the SUEAF model, the magnitude of the drift of large size firm sub-
sample (0.0250) is significantly smaller than the corresponding drift of small size firm sub-
sample (0.0462), but the magnitude of the earnings announcement window response of large size 
firm sub-sample (0.0667) is not very small compared to the corresponding earnings 
announcement window response of small size firm sub-sample (0.0703). 
Likewise, in the analysis of number of analyst following (Panel B) for the SUEAF model, 
we find that in the sub-sample where the firms are followed by greater than median number of 
analysts, earnings announcement window response (0.0734) is even greater than that in the sub-
sample where firms are followed by less than median number of analysts (0.0660), while the 
drift (0.0250) is smaller than the drift in the sub-sample where the firms are followed by smaller 
than median number of analysts (0.0482).  The results are similar in share price analysis (Panel 
C) and trading volume analysis (Panel D).  
Due to differences in the impact of a firm’s information environment on changes in the 
magnitude of CAR(Earnings Announcement Window) and CAR(Drift) between SUE and SUEAF, 
the difference in RW drift ratio and AF drift ratio is more pronounced when the quality of 
information environment is good. Specifically, for smaller firms the RW drift ratio is 46% and 
the AF drift ratio is 40%, whereas for large firms the RW drift ratio is 39% and the AF drift ratio 
is 27%.   
In sum, the findings in Table 7 show that the AF drift ratios are more sensitive to the 
firm’s information environment than the drift ratios for time-series based earnings surprises. In 
other words, investors respond even faster and more thoroughly at the earnings announcement 
window to analyst-based earnings surprises than to time-series based earnings surprises when the 
quality of information environment is high.  Based on this result, we infer that analyst forecasts 
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are especially more useful and informative to investors than time-series based earnings forecasts 
when the quality of the information environment is high.    
 
5. Additional tests 
  To check the robustness of the results, we conduct several additional tests. First, although 
we follow the typical research design of the most PEAD studies (i.e., pooled ordinary least 
squared regression), current research reveals that in the panel dataset the residuals may be 
correlated across firms or across time and thus OLS standard errors can be biased (Peterson 
2009). Therefore, we examine our results using both firm and year-quarter clustered standard 
errors, and we find that our results are not affected by this alternative approach.  
Second, we examine whether our results change depending on how to measure an 
earnings announcement window and a drift window. Replacing the original three day event 
window (i.e., (-1, 1) where 0 is earnings announcement date), we use five trading days as an 
earnings announcement window (i.e., (-1, 3)), and we measure a drift window starting on day 
four and ending one day after the following quarterly earnings announcement. Alternatively, we 
also define a drift window as (2, 60), following previous research (e.g., Liang (2003)), while 
maintaining the same three day earnings announcement window (-1, 1). Neither of the 
approaches makes significant differences in our findings, even though the magnitudes of the 
coefficients on various CAR(Earnings Ann. Window) and CAR(Drift) change a bit. 
 Third, when we measure analyst forecast based earnings surprise we include firm-
quarters which are followed by at least one analyst. In an alternative setting, we increase the 
minimum number of analyst following to two or three, and examine if this stringent requirement 
makes any difference. The results show that as the minimum number of analyst following 
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increases the coefficient estimate on CAR(Drift) decreases.  Specifically, the coefficient estimate 
on CAR(Drift) is 0.0308 (0.0229) when firm-quarters are followed by at least two (three) 
analysts, while the corresponding coefficient is 0.0390 when firm-quarters are followed by at 
least one analyst. Even though the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates get smaller, however, 
they are still significant at the 0.01 level. We also find that AF drift ratio decreases as the 
minimum number of analyst following increases. These findings are consistent with earlier 
results in Table 7, showing that when firms are large or followed by more analysts both the 
magnitude of the drift and the drift ratio are small compared to the firms which are small or 
followed by less analysts.  
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
In this study, we examine differences in market responses between two different earnings 
forecasts model: analyst-based earnings forecasts and time-series based earnings forecasts. 
Extending prior literature which focuses on differences in post-earnings-announcement-drifts 
between the two models, we examine the differences in the delayed portion of investors’ 
response relative to its total market response (i.e., a drift ratio). We believe that this alternative 
approach improves our understanding of the relation between different earnings surprises and its 
corresponding market reaction.  
We find that the total market responses toward analyst-based earnings surprises are much 
greater than those toward time-series based earnings surprises. On the other hand, we find that 
the AF drift ratio is significantly smaller than the RW drift ratio. This result suggests that analyst 
forecasts, on average, are more relevant and meaningful to investors than time-series based 
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forecasts. Hence, investors respond faster and more thoroughly around earnings announcement 
dates toward analyst-based earnings surprises than toward time-series based earnings surprises.   
Examining sub-samples over time, we find that the differences mentioned above are more 
prominent in recent years. Specifically, investors’ immediate responses toward analyst-based 
earnings surprises become larger over time, while investors’ delayed responses become smaller 
over time. Based on these findings, we conclude that analysts, on average, provide more relevant 
and meaningful earnings forecasts in recent years compared with the earlier years in our sample 
period.  
We also measure the informativeness of different earnings forecasts by using their past 
accuracy, and we examine its impact on the relation between earnings surprises and the market 
responses. We find that the total market response increases in the informativeness of earnings 
forecasts for both time-series based and analyst-based earnings forecasts. However, as the 
informativeness of earnings increase, investors’ responses to the analyst-based earnings surprises 
increase more in instant form than in delayed form. In contrast, investors’ delayed responses 
increase more than investors’ instant responses toward time-series based earnings surprises. 
Thus, the AF drift ratio decreases, while the RW drift ratio increases as the informativeness of 
earnings forecasts increases. This result means that the past accuracy of analyst earnings 
forecasts provides more relevant and useful information to investors than the past accuracy of 
time-series based earnings forecasts in terms of inducing investors’ timely responses.  
Finally, we find that the drift ratio of analyst-based earnings surprise is smaller when the 
quality of the firms’ information environment improves. More importantly, we find that the AF 
drift ratio is much smaller than the RW drift ratio when the quality of the firm’s information 
environment is high. This means that investors respond much faster and more thoroughly at the 
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earnings announcement window to analyst-based earnings surprises than to time-series based 
earnings surprises when the quality of the firms’ information environment is high. Overall, our 
results complement existing research findings by utilizing a relative PEAD measure and provide 
a greater understanding toward the interpretation of both drifts. 
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This figure reports drift ratio patterns across years when earnings surprises are measured using time-series model (SUE) and 
analysts’ forecast based model (SUEAF). Drift ratio is calculated by the slope coefficient in the regression of CAR(Drift) on the 
earnings surprise decile rank (DSUE or DSUEAF) divided by the slope coefficient in the regression of CAR(Total) on the 
earnings surprise decile rank (DSUE or DSUEAF). CAR(Drift) is the abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from two days 
after an earnings announcement through one day after the next quarterly earnings announcement. CAR(Total) is the abnormal 
return on a stock, cumulated from one day before an earnings announcement through one day after the next quarterly earnings 
announcement. The abnormal return is the raw return minus the average return on a same size-B/M portfolio (six portfolios), 
as provided by Professor French.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics  
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 50th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
SUE 224,412  -0.0004 0.4106 -0.0238 -0.0047 0.0015 0.0056 0.0180 
SUEAF  224,412  -0.0028 0.1150 -0.0069 -0.0010 0.0003 0.0019 0.0055 
CAR(Total)  224,412  -0.0091 0.2384 -0.2674 -0.1217 -0.0051 0.1083 0.2412 
CAR(Earnings Ann. Window)  224,412  0.0016 0.0824 -0.0816 -0.0334 0.0008 0.0372 0.0871 
CAR(Drift)  224,412  -0.0107 0.2209 -0.2469 -0.1132 -0.0068 0.0964 0.2177 
Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)   219,196  0.0870 3.1516 0.0025 0.0042 0.0089 0.0210 0.0513 
Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)  215,609  0.0074 0.0518 0.0005 0.0010 0.0023 0.0053 0.0126 
MCAP(in $million)  224,412       3,692     15,597            68          171          552       1,922       6,430  
Price  224,412  45.03 1393.00 5.50 10.90 20.50 33.88 49.81 
NUMEST  224,412  4.7 4.6 1.0 1.0 3.0 6.0 11.0 
VOLUME 224,325  0.0070 0.0087 0.0012 0.0022 0.0044 0.0087 0.0155 
 
This table includes all firm-quarters with data to calculate SUE, SUEAF, and returns during the period Q1/1984 to Q4/2010.  
SUE = earnings per share before extraordinary items (Compustat item EPSPXQ) minus 
(adjusted) earnings per share in the same quarter of the prior year, scaled by the price 
per share at the end of the quarter;  
SUEAF =  the I/B/E/S actual minus I/B/E/S median forecast in the 90-day period before the 
earnings announcement date, scaled by price per share at quarter end. We require firm-
quarters to have at least one analyst forecast during the 90-day period before the 
disclosure of earnings; 
CAR(Total) = CAR(Drift) + CAR(Earnings Announcement Window); 
CAR(Earnings Ann. Window) = cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window (−1,+1) centered on the earnings 
announcement date of the current quarter t. The abnormal return is the raw return minus 
the average return on a same size-B/M portfolio (six portfolios), as provided by 
Professor French; 
CAR(Drift) = abnormal return on a stock, cumulated from two days after an earnings announcement 
through one day after the next quarterly earnings announcement; 
Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)   = average absolute values of SUE of the past twelve quarters. If the firm-quarters have 
less than nine SUEs during the past 12 quarters, it is regarded as missing; 
Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1) = average absolute values of SUEAF of the past twelve quarters. If the firm-quarters have 
less than nine SUEAFs during the past 12 quarters, it is regarded as missing; 
MCAP (in $million) = number of shares outstanding * price per share at the end of the quarter; 
Price = share price at the end of the quarter; 
NUMEST  = number of analyst forecasts used in SUEAF; 
VOLUME = average daily turnover during forty-five days before the earnings announcement, where 
daily turnover is the ratio of the number of share traded each day to the number of 
shares outstanding. 
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TABLE 2 
Regression of Abnormal Returns on Earnings Surprises 
 
Panel A. Regression of CARs on DSUE 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 
Drift ratio 
 
CAR(Total) 
 
(1) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
               (2) 
       CAR(Drift) 
 
          (3) 
 Mean Median 
Intercept  -0.0088 
(-17.49) 
0.0018 
(10.49) 
 
-0.0106 
(-22.68) 
   
DSUE 0.0737 
(42.35) 
0.0407 
(68.02) 
0.0330 
(20.41) 
 0.51 0.55 
       
n 224,412 224,412 224,412    
Adj. R2 (%) 0.79 2.02 0.19    
 
 
Panel B. Regression of CARs on DSUEAF 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 
Drift ratio 
 
CAR(Total) 
 
      (1) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
                  (2) 
       CAR(Drift) 
 
           (3) 
 Mean Median 
Intercept -0.0092 
(-18.40) 
0.0016 
(9.44) 
 
-0.0107 
(-23.09) 
   
DSUEAF 0.1080 
(68.16) 
0.0690 
(129.25) 
0.0390 
(26.31) 
 0.44 0.45 
       
n 224,412 224,412 224,412    
Adj. R2 (%) 2.03 6.93 0.31    
Incremental R2 (%) over 
results in Panel A 
1.24 4.91 0.12 
   
(Vuong’s Z-statistic) (18.02) (42.78) (4.31)    
Test of difference in drift 
ratios between Panel A and 
Panel B (p-value) 
    
0.0041 0.0009 
 
This table reports the results of regressing three different CARs (i.e., CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings Announcement 
Window), and CAR(Drift)) on DSUE (DSUEAF), respectively.  
DSUE (or DSUEAF) is an adjusted decile rank of SUE (or SUEAF). It is calculated by sorting firms according to SUE 
(or SUEAF) every quarter, assigning the firms to ten groups, and assigning the decile rank to each firm within a 
decile. The measure is then divided by 9 minus 0.5. 
Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics unless noted otherwise.  A t-statistic of 2.58 implies a significance level of 0.01 
using a two-tailed test. Vuong’s Z-statistic refers to the Z-statistic from the likelihood ratio test proposed by Vuong 
(1989) for non-nested model selection. A Z-statistic of 2.58 implies a significance level of 0.01 using a two-tailed test.   
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TABLE 3 
Instant vs. Delayed Earnings Response Coefficients and Drift Ratios over Time (Comparison between DSUE 
and DSUEAF measures) 
 
Sample period 
(n) 
  CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
CAR(Drift) 
       Drift Ratio 
 CAR(Total) Mean     Median 
1984-1986 
(10,595) 
DSUE 0.0897 0.0325 0.0572 0.62 0.68 
DSUEAF 0.0623 0.0284 0.0339 0.53 0.55 
Test-of-difference     p=0.3160 p=0.1289 
1987-1989 
(14,333) 
DSUE 0.0840 0.0359 0.0481 0.52 0.57 
DSUEAF 0.0903 0.0338 0.0565 0.60 0.60 
Test-of-difference     p=0.1588 p=0.1294 
1990-1992 
(17,778) 
DSUE 0.0943 0.0499 0.0444 0.47 0.53 
DSUEAF 0.1149 0.0564 0.0586 0.55 0.57 
Test-of-difference     p=0.1429 p=0.2754 
1993-1995 
(25,703) 
DSUE 0.0847 0.0380 0.0467 0.53 0.59 
DSUEAF 0.1156 0.0549 0.0607 0.51 0.46 
Test-of-difference     p=0.8140 p=0.4648 
1996-1998 
(33,092) 
DSUE 0.0673 0.0382 0.0290 0.47 0.51 
DSUEAF 0.1127 0.0608 0.0519 0.48 0.49 
Test-of-difference     p=0.8186 p=1.0000 
1999-2001 
(30,254) 
DSUE 0.0692 0.0381 0.0311 0.59 0.60 
DSUEAF 0.1024 0.0674 0.0351 0.39 0.43 
Test-of-difference     p=0.0502 p=0.0625 
2002-2004 
(30,085) 
DSUE 0.0664 0.0324 0.0340 0.50 0.57 
DSUEAF 0.0982 0.0715 0.0267 0.34 0.38 
Test-of-difference     p=0.1122 p=0.2500 
2005-2007 
(31,806) 
DSUE 0.0924 0.0465 0.0459 0.45 0.49 
DSUEAF 0.1183 0.0889 0.0294 0.24 0.24 
Test-of-difference     p <.0001 p=0.0010 
2008-2010 
(30,766) 
DSUE 0.0423 0.0491 -0.0068 0.47 0.47 
DSUEAF 0.1199 0.1076 0.0122 0.23 0.26 
Test-of-difference     p=0.0196 p=0.0313 
This table reports the coefficients in the regression of three different CARs (i.e., CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings 
Announcement Window), and CAR(Drift)) on DSUE and DSUEAF, respectively.  
Drift ratio is calculated by the slope coefficient in the regression of CAR(Drift) on the earnings surprise decile rank (DSUE or 
DSUEAF) divided by the slope coefficient in the regression of CAR(Total) on the earnings surprise decile rank (DSUE or 
DSUEAF).  
Mean (Median) drift ratio is the mean (median) quarterly drift ratios over the sample period.  
t-statistics (Wilcoxon signed rank-statistics) is used for the test of mean (median) difference.   
See Table 1 for the definitions of variables.  
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Time Horizon on the Relation between Earnings Surprises and the Market Responses 
 
Panel A. Regression of CARs on DSUE and its interaction with recency 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 
 
CAR(Total) 
 
      (1) 
CAR(Earnings Ann. 
Window) 
    (2) 
      CAR(Drift) 
 
     (3) 
Intercept -0.0088 
(-17.48) 
  0.0018 
(10.49) 
-0.0106 
(-22.68) 
DSUE 0.0958 
(22.19) 
0.0349 
(23.52) 
0.0609 
(15.18) 
DSUE*Recency 
  
-0.0003 
(-5.60) 
0.0001 
(4.26) 
-0.0004 
(-7.60) 
    
n 224,412 224,412 224,412 
 Adj. R2 (%) 0.81 2.03 0.21 
 
 
Panel B. Regression of CARs on DSUEAF and its interaction with recency 
 
  Dependent Variable  
 
CAR(Total) 
 
     (1) 
CAR(Earnings Ann. 
Window) 
   (2) 
      CAR(Drift) 
 
   (3) 
Intercept -0.0092 
(-18.43) 
0.0015 
(9.25) 
-0.0107 
(-23.04) 
DSUEAF 0.0923 
(23.89) 
0.0237 
(18.25) 
0.0686 
(19.00) 
DSUEAF*Recency  
 
0.0003 
(4.47) 
0.0007 
(38.32) 
-0.0005 
(-8.99) 
    
n 224,412 224,412 224,412 
 Adj. R2 (%) 2.04 7.53 0.34 
 
This table reports the coefficients in the regression of three different CARs (i.e., CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings 
Announcement Window), and CAR(Drift)) on the earnings surprise and its interaction with recency factor (i.e., (DSUE 
and DSUE*Recency) or (DSUEAF and  DSUEAF*Recency).  
Recency equals zero if a firm-quarter belongs to Q1/1984 and increases by one as the firm-quarters move on to the following 
quarters, and thus its maximum value is 107 when the firm-quarters belong to the most recent quarter (i.e., Q4/2010).  
See Table 1 for the definitions of variables.  
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TABLE 5 
The Effect of Informativeness of Earnings Forecasts on the Relation between Earnings Surprises and the 
Market Responses 
 
Panel A. Regression of CARs on DSUE and its interaction with mean absolute SUE of the past 12 quarters 
 
  
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Drift ratio 
(excluding 
interaction 
term) 
Drift ratio 
(including 
interaction 
term)† 
 
CAR(Total) 
 
      (1) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
    (2) 
      CAR(Drift) 
 
     (3) 
Intercept -0.0080 
(-15.84) 
  0.0019 
(10.95) 
-0.0099 
(-21.10) 
  
DSUE 0.0762 
(42.01) 
0.0419 
(67.02) 
0.0344 
(20.37) 
0.45  
DSUE* 
 D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  
0.0371 
(6.11) 
0.0146 
(6.97) 
0.0225 
(3.99) 
 0.50 
      
n 219,196 219,196 219,196   
 Adj. R2 (%) 0.81 2.05 0.19   
 
 
Panel B. Regression of CARs on DSUEAF and its interaction with mean absolute SUEAF of the past 12 quarters 
 
  
Dependent 
Variable 
 Drift ratio 
(excluding 
interaction 
term) 
Drift ratio 
(including 
interaction 
term)† 
 
CAR(Total) 
 
     (1) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
   (2) 
      CAR(Drift) 
 
   (3) 
Intercept -0.0085 
(-16.81) 
0.0018 
(10.27) 
-0.0103 
(-21.70) 
  
DSUEAF 0.1113 
(66.20) 
0.0725 
(127.53) 
0.0388 
(24.71) 
0.35  
DSUEAF*  
D_Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1) 
0.0371 
(6.67) 
0.0316 
(16.82) 
0.0055 
(1.06) 
 0.26 
      
n 215,609 215,609 215,609   
 Adj. R2 (%) 2.05 7.15 0.30   
 
This table reports the coefficients in the regression of three different CARs (i.e., CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings 
Announcement Window), and CAR(Drift)) on the earnings surprise and its interaction with informativeness proxy (i.e., 
(DSUE and DSUE* D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)) or (DSUEAF and  DSUEAF* D_Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1))).  
D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) (D_Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)) is an adjusted decile rank of Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) (Mean Abs. 
SUEAF(t-12, t-1)). It is calculated by multiplying negative one to Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) (Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)), and 
then it is transformed into a decile rank by sorting firms according to every quarter. The measure is then divided by 9 
minus 0.5.  
 †Drift Ratio (including interaction term) is calculated by the sum of the slope coefficient in the regression of CAR(Drift) on the 
earnings surprise decile rank and its interaction with informativeness proxy (i.e., (DSUE and DSUE* D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)) 
or (DSUEAF and  DSUEAF* D_Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1))) divided by the sum of the slope coefficient in the regression of 
CAR(Total) on the earnings surprise decile rank and its interaction with informativeness proxy (i.e., (DSUE and DSUE* 
D_Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)) or (DSUEAF and  DSUEAF* D_Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)))  
See Table 1 for the definitions of variables.  
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TABLE 6 
The Market Responses at Different Levels of Informativeness of Earnings Forecasts 
 
Panel A. The Earnings Response Coefficients at Different Levels of Informativeness of Time-series based Earnings 
Forecasts 
(-)Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) 
Quintile Rank 
 
n 
CAR 
(Total) 
(1) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window)  
(2) 
CAR 
(Drift)  
(3) 
Drift Ratio  
Rank1 
(Least informative) 
DSUE 43795 0.0649 0.0380 0.0269 0.41 
Rank2 DSUE 43860 0.0693 0.0378 0.0315 0.45 
Rank3 DSUE 43866 0.0762 0.0423 0.0338 0.44 
Rank4 DSUE 43860 0.0899 0.0474 0.0425 0.47 
Rank5 
(Most informative) 
DSUE 43815 0.0954 0.0536 0.0418 0.44 
 
 
Panel B. The Earnings Response Coefficients at Different Levels of Informativeness of Analyst-based Earnings 
Forecasts 
(-)Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1) 
Quintile Rank 
 
n 
CAR 
(Total) 
(1) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window)  
(2) 
CAR 
(Drift)  
(3) 
Drift Ratio  
Rank1 
(Least informative) 
DSUEAF 43076 0.0964 0.0605 0.0359 0.37 
Rank2 DSUEAF 43142 0.1092 0.0676 0.0416 0.38 
Rank3 DSUEAF 43147 0.1092 0.0731 0.0360 0.33 
Rank4 DSUEAF 43145 0.1242 0.0828 0.0414 0.33 
Rank5 
(Most informative) 
DSUEAF 43099 0.1368 0.0916 0.0452 0.33 
This table reports the coefficients in the regression of three different CARs (i.e., CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings Announcement 
Window), and CAR(Drift)) on DSUE and DSUEAF at different informativeness levels (i.e., (-)Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) or (-
)Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)). 
(-)Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1) is Mean Abs. SUE(t-12, t-1)  multiplied by negative one.  
(-)Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1) is Mean Abs. SUEAF(t-12, t-1)  multiplied by negative one.  
See Table 1 for the definitions of variables.  
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Firm Characteristics on the Relation between Earnings Surprises and the Market Responses 
 
Panel A. Firm size and drift ratios 
 
 
n CAR(Total) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
CAR(Drift) Drift ratio  
MCAP is less than median 
DSUE 112,179 0.0912 0.0494 0.0419 0.46 
DSUEAF 112,179 0.1165 0.0703 0.0462 0.40 
MCAP is greater than median 
DSUE 112,233 0.0430 0.0262 0.0168 0.39 
DSUEAF 112,233 0.0917 0.0667 0.0250 0.27 
 
Panel B. Number of analyst following and drift ratios  
 
 
n CAR(Total) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
CAR(Drift) Drift ratio  
NUMEST is less than median 
DSUE 111,580 0.0947 0.0486 0.0461 0.49 
DSUEAF 111,580 0.1143 0.0660 0.0482 0.42 
NUMEST is greater than median 
DSUE 112,832 0.0484 0.0310 0.0174 0.36 
DSUEAF 112,832 0.0985 0.0734 0.0250 0.25 
 
Panel C. Price and drift ratios 
 
 
n CAR(Total) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
CAR(Drift) Drift ratio  
PRICE is less than median 
DSUE 112167 0.0791 0.0444 0.0348 0.44 
DSUEAF 112167 0.1103 0.0688 0.0415 0.38 
PRICE is greater than median 
DSUE 112245 0.0611 0.0328 0.0282 0.46 
DSUEAF 112245 0.1029 0.0695 0.0334 0.32 
 
Panel D. Trading volumes and drift ratios 
 
 
n CAR(Total) 
CAR(Earnings 
Ann. Window) 
CAR(Drift) Drift ratio  
VOLUME is less than median 
DSUE 112136 0.0876 0.0458 0.0418 0.48 
DSUEAF 112136 0.1059 0.0615 0.0444 0.42 
VOLUME is greater than median 
DSUE 112189 0.0619 0.0364 0.0256 0.41 
DSUEAF 112189 0.1105 0.0771 0.0334 0.30 
 
This table reports the coefficients in the regression of three different CARs (i.e., CAR(Total), CAR(Earnings Announcement 
Window), and CAR(Drift)) on DSUE and DSUEAF at different levels of firm characteristics such as firm size, number of 
analyst following, share price, and trading volumes. 
See Table 1 for the definitions of variables. 
